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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1915-19116
II. CONTRACTS
The field of general contract law was barren of significant
decisions, but some cases dealing with rather specialized branches
of that subject are worthy of notice.
INSURANCE
In Olympia Fields Country Club v. Bankers Indemnity Insur-
ance Company,' a case of first impression in this state, the Appel-
late Court held that an insurance company could be liable for
arbitrarily and unreasonably refusing to settle a case for an
amount within the policy limits provided such refusal amounted
to bad faith. The stock situation, such as was there presented,
involves one wherein the insured is liable, where the plaintiff offers
to settle within the policy coverage, wherein the carrier gambles
on the chance of a judgment after trial for less than the offer of
settlement, where the final judgment exceeds the policy coverage,
and where the insured is personally obliged to pay that part of the
judgment which exceeds the policy limits. Under the usual public
liability policy, the insurer has the exclusive right to defend or to
negotiate a settlement. The exclusive nature of the insurer's right
raises a corresponding duty to act in good faith. Just what con-
stitutes good faith or what facts show a breach of it, may, be
difficult to determine. Gross negligence on the part of the carrier
may constitute bad faith, although a mistake in judgment is hardly
sufficient. There are many cases in other jurisdictions on the
subject,2 so the broad principle seems hardly possible of contradic-
tion, but as the instant case turned on an erroneously directed
verdict it is necessary to await the final outcome to determine just
what conduct will be treated as evidence of bad faith in this state.
The only other insurance case of significance is that of In re
Thompson's Estate2 where the Appellate Court held that a policy
1325 Ill. App. 649, 60 N. E. (2d) 896 (1945), noted in 24 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW
REviaw 198, 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 105.
2 See cases discussed and cataloged in 24 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 198, par-
ticularly pp. 200-5.
a Sub nom. Roberts v. Dempsey, 328 Ill. App. 103, 65 N. E. (2d) 131 (1946),
noted in 34 Ill. B. J. 536. Leave to appeal has been denied.
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of life insurance on the life of the donor may be made the subject
of a gift and, if there is actual delivery of the policy, no written
assignment is necessary. As between donor, donee and donor's
estate, there has been little question but that a policy of life insur-
ance may be assigned by way of gift. The problem has usually
been as to the method or the sufficiency of the assignment. It is
almost uniformly concluded that no writing is necessary in order
to vest at least an equitable interest 4 although, if there is a statute
requiring a writing, the statute would control. While there is no
such statute applicable in Illinois, an earlier Illinois Supreme
Court decision had contained dicta from which it might be inferred
that a writing would be necessary.5 The instant case indicates
that delivery together with proper accompanying words will be
sufficient to sustain a gift causa mortis. -
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
While no significant Illinois cases involving negotiable instru-
ments reached the reviewing courts of the state during the period of
this survey, the Indiana case of W. H. Barber Company v. Hughes6
will interest Illinois lawyers because of the constant commercial
relationships with our sister state. It will be recalled that the
Indiana Supreme Court, in Egley v. T. B. Bennett & Company,7
ruled that a negotiable instrument containing a confession of
judgment clause was not ordinarily enforcible in Indiana because
contrary to its public policy, although it held that it was obliged,
under the full faith and credit clause, to give recognition to a
judgment obtained in Illinois on a cognovit note where such note
was payable in Illinois even though it was executed in Indiana.
Since that decision, the Indiana legislature has adopted a
statute declaring unlawful all contracts and stipulations for con-
fession of judgment under powers of attorney granted prior to the
accrual of a cause of action to enforce payment of money, which
424 Am. Jur., Gifts, § 70; 38 C. J. S., Gifts, § 98.
5 Weaver v. Weaver, 182 Ill. 287, 55 N. E. 338 (1899). In that case, however,
there had been no delivery of the policy.
6- Ind. -, 63 N. El. (2d) 417 (1945), noted in 21 Notre Dame Lawyer 187.
7196 Ind. 50, 145 N. 19. 830, 40 A. L. R. 436 (1924).
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statute carries a penalty for entering into such agreements.8 It
was assumed that this law effectively voided cognovit notes in that
state. However, in the instant case, the defendants unsuccessfully
sought to apply this statute to prevent the enforcement in Indiana
of an Illinois judgment obtained on a cognovit note which, though
payable in Illinois, had been signed in Indiana. Refusing to hold
the statute applicable, the court ruled that though the instrument
was signed in Indiana it could not be said to have been finally
executed until the plaintiff accepted it in Illinois and gave value
for it by crediting it against back items due on defendant's open
account. It was, consequently, a case where the Illinois law should
rule. The court reached its conclusion by resorting to the so-called
"points of contact" method recommended by modern authorities
on the subject of the Conflict of Laws. That rule, which may prove
serviceable in other similar cases, contemplates that the court
should consider all acts of the parties touching the transaction in
relation to the several states involved but should apply, as the
law governing the transaction, the law of that state with which
the facts are in most intimate contact.9
QUASI-CONTRACTS
Successful maintenance of a quasi-contractual action against
a municipal government for the reasonable value of services ren-
dered has been made difficult in the past by reason of two lines of
conflicting authority. If the claim is based upon a. contract for
which no prior appropriation has been made, recovery has been
denied, particularly so where, to impose liability, debts would be
created in excess of constitutional limitations:10 On the other hand,
if the service is rendered on a public improvement payable from a
special assessment fund, no prior appropriation is necessary and
the constitutional limitation is then inapplicable, so quasi-con-
tractual recovery might be possible.'1 An extension to the latter
8 Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. 1927, §§ 2-2904 to 2-2906.
9 See the discussion of this proposition In - Ind. - at -, (3 N. E. (2d) 417 at
423.
10 Hancock v. Village of Hazel Crest, 318 Ill. App. 170, 47 N. E. (2d) 557 (194&).
11 Gray v. City of Joliet, 287 Ill. 280, 122 N. E. 550 (1919) ; Markman v. Calumet
City, 29T Ill. App. 531. 18 N. E. (2d) 75 (1938).
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doctrine has been given in the case of DeLeuw, Cather & Company
v. City of Joliet" where it was held that recovery on quantum
meruit was proper, even though no valid contract existed, because
compensation was to be derived from funds furnished by a federal
loan and grant for a municipal water works system, hence would
require no prior appropriation nor would create any addition to
the municipal general indebtedness.
The Restatement of the Law of Restitution intimates that if
one officiously purports to act as agent for another he may be
entitled to receive compensation for his services in so acting if the
other accepts the benefits thus produced.13 A complaint framed on
that theory, however, was held insufficient in the case of Straus v.
Spiegel, Inc.,14 to support recovery upon the ground that the
plaintiff was either conferring his services gratuitously 1 or else
was the agent for the other party, so could not be defendant's
agent. It appeared that plaintiff, a real estate broker, was asked
by representatives of the U. S. Army to provide a list of available
properties and to arrange interviews with their owners. Plaintiff,
with defendant's full knowledge of plaintiff's occupation, arranged
an interview between the army representatives and defendant
which culminated in a favorable lease of defendant's property.
Plaintiff's attempt to recover in quantum meruit for services ren-
dered was rejected for the reasons aforementioned. There is occa-
sion to believe, however, that liability might have arisen had
defendant permitted the broker to negotiate the lease, especially
in view of the broker's expectation of payment for his services. 16
SALES
The law regarding the liability of sellers to persons injured
by defective or dangerous instruments seems to have been ex-
tended, at least to the extent that it was applied to a new factual
situation such as was found in Lindroth v. Walgreen Company.
7
12327 Ill. App. 453, 64 N. E. (2d) 779 (1946). Leave to appeal has been denied.
13 See comment, Restatement, Restitution, § 112, at p. 463.
14 153 F. (2d) 268 (1946).
15 See Evans v. Henry, 66 Ill. App. 144 (1896).
16 Linn v. Linderoth, 40 Ill. App. 320 (1891).
17 329 Ill. App. 105, 67 N. E. (2d) 595 (1946).
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The defendant company was there held liable for injuries resulting
to an infant plaintiff from burns sustained when a vaporizer, with-
out a thermal cut-out, set the child's bed on fire. Liability was
predicated upon an express warranty, made by the sales person to
the plaintiff's mother, that the vaporizer was safe if operated for
periods not to exceed two hours. The court may have been un-
consciously influenced by the fact that the vaporizer was sold
under a label saying "Quick, safe, no-flame, electrical."
Ordinarily, the passage of title to goods takes place when the
goods are delivered to a common carrier for shipment to the pur-
chaser. In Department of Revenue v. Jennison-Wright Corpora-
tion, 8 there was an Illinois contract to sell timber for railroad ties
and also another contract to creosote them. Inspection of the
"4green" ties by the ultimate consumer took place in Alabama.
The consumer paid the freight charges to Illinois where the ties
were to be stored for seasoning until ready for creosoting, which
operation was not to be performed until the consumer so decided.
After processing by defendant corporation, the seasoned ties were
loaded aboard the consumer's cars and the agreed price was then
paid. The issue being the taxability of the defendant corporation
under the Illinois Retailers' Occupational Tax Act, 19 it was de-
cided, over defendant's claim that the transaction was one of
bailment rather than of sale, that there remained something to be
done to the goods by the seller and therefore title to the timber
did not pass in Alabama but only in Illinois after final inspection
covering both seasoning and creosoting. There was, unfortunately,
no mention of the risk of loss, an element which would also have
been relevant on the point as to when title passed.
As there is no requirement for the recording of conditional
sales agreements in Illinois, there is no specific limitation of time
as to when a conditional seller should exercise his remedies in
order not to be estopped as against a judgment creditor of the
purchaser. Recognition of that fact had been accorded by the
is 393 Il1. 401, 66 N. E. (2d) 395 (1946).
19 I1. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 120, § 440 et seq.
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Appellate Court for the First District in an earlier case.20 That
case has now been followed, by the Appellate Court for the Third
District, in Thom.As v. State Bank of Saybrook,2 1 where it was held
that the conditional seller's rights in a farm combine were not
prejudiced by a period of inaction lasting four and one-half months
after the indebtedness became due at least as against the asserted
rights of a judgment creditor of the purchaser.
III. CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
While issues of practice and procedure are presented in almost
every case taken to the reviewing courts, many of the points pre-
sented are so well-settled as to be almost trite. Some cases do,
however, involve unsettled questions of procedural law, although
often of slight importance, so such cases are here summarized and
arranged in substantially the same order as these questions would
probably occur in the conduct of litigation.
AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES
Without question, the practitioner should be concerned with
the matter of jurisdiction, particularly in the sense of the power
to hear and determine, for otherwise his efforts may come to
naught. The existence of monetary limitations upon the jurisdic-
tion of certain of the inferior courts of this state has produced
problems as to whether or not the litigant may (1) state a case
involving more but seek only the jurisdictional figure,' or (2) sue
for more upon a case involving more but voluntarily remit that
part of a verdict in excess of the jurisdictional limitation.2 An-
other innovation has been introduced by the case of Binger v.
Baker s a suit originally brought before a justice of the peace
upon a claim exceeding $500 wherein verdict in excess of that
20 American Type Founders Co. v. Metropolitan Credit & Discount Corp., 271 Il.
App. 380 (1933), noted in 13 CHIOAoO-KMNT REvIEw 28.
21328 Ill. App. 184, 65 N. E. (2d) 626 (1946).
1 Dahlgren v. Israel, 204 Ill. App. 340 (1917), abst. opin.
2G. B. Hemingway Co. v. Keagle, 181 Ill. App. 5 (1913).
3 326 Ill. App. 639, 63 N. E. (2d) 256 (1945).
